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DOLLARS AND SENSE: A "NEW PARADIGM" FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM?
DanielA. Farber*
In Voting with Dollars,' ProfessorsAckerman and Ayres raise a
multitude of issues as they seek to "rethink the very foundations of
the enterprise" of campaign finance reform.2 To provide a format
for examining this "new paradigm,"' this essay takes the form of a
fictional panel discussion. All of the participants are generally
sympathetic with the goals of the proposal, but they reach somewhat varying conclusions about its implementation.4
Moderator:
I am happy to welcome you all to this conference on "The Future
of American Democracy." We are very grateful to the Dean for his
generous financial support of this important symposium. I would
also like to thank all of the participants who have come here today.
I want to leave plenty of time for the panelists to give their views,
so I will keep my introductory remarks very brief.
It is hard to be sanguine about the present state of American
politics. The cost of political campaigns continues to mount, and
fund-raising seems ever more critical to the efforts of candidates.
Even the most unworldly of U.S. Supreme Court Justices now
takes for granted that "someone making an extraordinarily large

* Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley; McKnight Presidential
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A., 1971, University of Illinois; M.A., 1972,
University of Illinois; J.D., 1975, University of Illinois. I benefited from discussions about the
book with Guy Charles before the drafting of this essay, and from comments on an early
draft by David McGowan.
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 9.
4. By setting up the panel this way, I do not mean to imply that the validity of these
goals is outside the range of legitimate discussion; rather, my focus here happens to be on the
method of implementation.
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contribution is going to get some kind of an extraordinary return
for it."' In the meantime, the public is increasingly cynical about
the process, discussion of issues takes second place to sensationalist "sound bites," and voter participation is in the cellar. This does
not correspond to most people's vision of an ideal democratic process.
Indeed, the public's view of politics has become so cynical as to
threaten the basic legitimacy of the democratic process. Consider
these statistics: When asked whether "the government was run for
the benefit of the public or for special interests, in 1964" almost
two-thirds of respondents thought the answer was "the public";
thirty years later, less than a fifth thought so.6 That's a huge collapse of public confidence. Similarly, when asked whether "quite a
few" government officials are "crooked," only a quarter said yes in
1958, but twice as many thought so in 1994. 7 Over roughly the
same time period, the percentage who thought that officials ignore
their constituents also nearly doubled.' Clearly, concerns about
special interests have reached epidemic proportions. At some point,
you have to wonder if public confidence in democracy will collapse.
Yet, effective reform has proved elusive. A new book by two distinguished Yale professors, Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, provides some wonderfully innovative ideas about how to reinvigorate
democracy. 9 That book is the subject of our session this morning.
Today, we have with us three leading scholars who will comment on the book. As I understand it, Professor Browne will summarize the book and explain the Ackerman and Ayres reform
scheme. Professor Graye will explore the constitutional issues
raised by their proposal. Finally, Professor Whyte of our own faculty will discuss the policy aspects of the proposal. I would especially like to thank Professor Whyte for taking part in the panel.
He was a last-minute substitute when one of the original panelists
had to cancel. Even though his primary interest is environmental
law rather than constitutional law, he bravely agreed to help fill
the gap.
5. Transcript of Oral Argument, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Pol. Action Comm., 528
U.S. 377 (2000) (No. 98-963), availableat 1999 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 76, at 27. See also John
Copeland Nagle, Corruption,Pollution,and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 293, 295 (2000).
6. David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate
Contributions and IndependentExpenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 96 (1998).
7. Id. at98.
8. Id.
9. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1.
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Before I turn the podium over to Professor Browne, I've been
asked to make a couple of announcements. Those of you who are
applying for CLE credit should put your names and addresses on
the sign-up sheet at the back of the room. Also, box lunches will be
served in the courtyard after this session. We didn't expect such a
big crowd today, but we'll do our best to see that everyone gets
something to eat. I guess, in retrospect, we shouldn't have been
surprised that the book has received so much attention. And now,
with no further ado, let me introduce Professor Browne.
ProfessorBrowne:
It's a great honor to be participating in this symposium today.
I'm especially delighted to be on this particular panel. Campaign
reform is a critical topic, and this book offers the first really new
thoughts about the subject for years. I'm going to try to give you a
fairly complete picture of the book's major arguments. Before I begin, however, I'd like to thank our law review hosts for all the hard
work they have done in setting up this symposium. I can only hope
that the editing process will be equally pleasurable!
I can't really improve upon Ackerman and Ayres's own description of their proposals. I say "proposals" because there are really
two interlinked ideas here. The first idea is the use of vouchers instead of direct government subsidies for campaigns. Ackerman and
Ayres describe these vouchers, or "Patriot dollars" as they call
them, as follows:
Just as [a citizen] receives a ballot on election day, he should also receive a special credit card to finance his favorite candidate as she
makes her case to the electorate. Call it a Patriot card, and suppose
that Congress seeded every voter's account with fifty "patriot dollars." If the 100 million Americans who came to the polls in 2000 had
also "voted" with their patriot cards during the campaign, their combined contributions would have amounted to $5 billion10
overwhelming the $3 billion provided by private donors.

With these credit cards, citizens can fund campaigns with "[a]
trip to their neighborhood ATMs, or eventually a click of their
mouse on the Internet."11 Thus, Patriot dollars are supposed to
democratize campaign financing.
10. Id. at 4-5.
11. Id. at 18.
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But what about those who still wish to make private donations? This is where the second idea, the secret donation booth,
comes into play. Here is how Ackerman and Ayres describe the
secret donation booth:
Contributors will be barred from giving money directly to candidates. They must instead pass their checks through a blind trust.
Candidates will get access to all money deposited in their account
with the blind trust. But we will take steps to assure that they won't
be able to identify who provided the funds. To be sure, lots of people
will come up to the candidate and say they have given vast sums of
money. And yet none of them will be able to prove it. As a consedidn't give gifts will also claim to have
quence, lots of people who 12
provided millions of dollars.

Wow! Talk about cutting the Gordian knot!"
Before I get into the details of this elegant set of proposals, I
should say something about the goals Ackerman and Ayres have
in mind. As they point out, liberal democracy tries to fuse "two
spheres of life":14 the public sphere, in which citizens meet as
equals to decide public policy, and the private sphere of market
transactions, in which economic inequalities are inevitable. 1" But
how do we know that those economic inequalities are legitimate?
Only because they have been accepted by the political process, so
that citizens have collectively agreed to the current distribution of
wealth. But if wealth is allowed to drive politics, this process becomes circular, so that the current distribution of wealth just
ends up perpetuating itself via the political process. 6 If wealth
inequality is to be legitimate, therefore, "one person one vote"
must not be allowed to deteriorate into "one dollar one vote."
More importantly, "[u]nless we find a way to democratize campaign finance, the right to vote will become mere shadow play." 7

12. Id. at 6.
13. The law review editors were worried that the reader might find this phrase too
obscure. To "cut the Gordian knot" means to "solve a problem boldly," acting "quickly and
decisively in a difficult situation." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 824 (2d ed.
1993).
14. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 12.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. Id. at 43. A similar argument is more fully developed in Edward B. Foley, EqualDollars-Per-Voter:A ConstitutionalPrincipleof CampaignFinance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204
(1994). Foley's proposed remedy is different. Id. at 1204. For a close analysis of the normative
aspect of Ackerman and Ayres's position, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Mixing Metaphors: Voting, Dollars, & CampaignFinanceReform, 2 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
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Law professors being as they are, no doubt someone, somewhere in the academic world would take issues with these normative premises. On some law faculty-perhaps at George Mason
University or the University of Chicago-there is probably someone who will argue that political influence should be a market
commodity like any other. But I don't accept that, and I don't
think the vast majority of Americans-be they liberal or conservative-would accept it either. Although they would not necessarily express such concepts with quite the subtlety and penetration
of Ackerman and Ayres, I believe our citizenry would enthusiastically endorse their goals.
In addition to providing the basis for legitimizing the private
sphere, Ackerman and Ayres see Patriot dollars as a way of recreating the social meaning of citizenship.'" As Ackerman and
Ayres observe, "political gift-giving has become an increasingly
important way in which Americans manifest their civic concern." 9 (Speaking only for myself, I have to confess that writing
those small checks has come to seem a lot more meaningful than
voting as an expression of civic involvement.) Patriot dollars will
also revive populism, for "[tihe beauty of the patriotic marketplace is that it diminishes the importance of existing links between establishment politicians and established funding sources,
instead requiring incumbents to be forever responsive to rising
tendencies in public opinion."" Here, too, I think that most
Americans would agree. We should be proud of our role as citizens, and politicians should attend to the popular will, not the desires of special interest groups. Yet, we all know about the disproportionate influence of special interest groups.21
Having briefly described their proposals and examined the
normative foundations, it's time to take a closer look at the details. One of the truest of truisms; after all, is that the devil is in
the details.

18. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 17.
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id. at 16.
21. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991) (assessing social science evidence of interest group influence);
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE

PUBLIC LAW 32-40 (1997) (evaluating interest group theory).
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The Patriot dollars would work like this: whenever a citizen
goes to the polls, she can open a Patriot account and record the
number of one of her existing ATM or credit cards.22 Instead of using an existing card, she can also choose to receive a special Patriot credit card.23 But to use this special card, citizens will have
to "prove their identity to an impartial official before entering a
secret donation booth to vote their Patriot dollars electronically."24 What happens when you stand in front of an ATM with
your Patriot-linked card? First, you will face "a screen revealing
three subaccounts, each containing an appropriate amount for the
25
open races [Presidential, Senate, House] in your constituency."
The money can be designated for any candidate running for the
House, anywhere in the country.26 Voters will be free to allocate
their funds between primaries and the general election.
The other half of the proposal is the secret donation booth. Under this scheme, the Federal Election Commission will establish a
blind trust to receive all private contributions. 2' The checks will
show only the trust as recipient; the ultimate target of the money
will be on a separate form.29 Donees can draw against these accounts, and normally the balances will be reported daily.3" Individuals who give less than $200 can get a receipt; others receive
only a notice that they gave more than this amount.31 Individuals
must mail the checks themselves at the post office.2 This blind
donation system will apply only to candidate-based contributions
to candidates, not to "issue-oriented campaigns independent of a
candidate's control."33
Two additional measures safeguard the anonymity of the system.34 First, there is a five-day revocation period. Hence, a cancelled check is meaningless because the donor might later have
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 101.
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requested a refund. 35 Second, the very largest donors must "actually enter a physical donation booth if they wish to make a gift of
more than $10,000.''36 It will resemble an ordinary voting booth,
and only the donor will be permitted inside.37
The big problem is how to prevent people from beating the system. For instance:
Suppose D tells C that she will be depositing $100,000 on June 1;
and suppose that D's campaign chest has been growing at about
$10,000 a day for the past few weeks. Then the 6th comes around,
and A's account suddenly jumps by $110,000. Surely this eyecatching jump will vastly enhance the credibility of D's earlier promise-and 38a grateful C will not forget D's largesse if he wins on election day!

Ackerman and Ayres offer a very ingenious solution to these efforts to "bomb" the process. Their solution is a secrecy algorithm
39
that will spread large donations randomly over several weeks.
They claim that their "secrecy algorithm creates such a 'noisy
signal' that it will defeat almost all efforts at accurate identification."4 ° Far be it from me to dispute their math.
The details of the proposal quickly become quite complex, as
with most regulatory schemes. Rather than discuss these details,
I'd like to emphasize the importance of the venture upon which
Ackerman and Ayres have embarked. In their own words:
This is, in short, a very good time to break the cycle of reform and
despair that looms before us. Senators McCain and Feingold have
shown that the public is serious about serious change. The only
question is to identify the reforms which deserve priority in the next
major legislative initiative.
will shape the future of American democracy for genThe answer
41
erations.

We might quarrel about whether they have the right solution,
but no one should doubt the significance of their quest.
Ackerman and Ayres claim that their proposals are fully con-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 104.
at 49.
at 50.
at 178.
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stitutional.4 2 "By framing our proposals to comply strictly with all
existing constitutional requirements," they contend that "the new
paradigm authorizes massive change now, and that activists need
not content themselves with marginal improvements until the
dawning of the day of judicial repentance."4 3
Speaking for myself, I tend to be a little less hopeful about the
judicial process, given the current makeup of the Supreme Court
and the kinds of new appointments we can currently expect to
see. But I will leave the constitutional issues to the next speaker.
All we can do where the courts are concerned is to hope for the
best. In the meantime, we can at least applaud Ackerman and
Ayres for a refreshing and imaginative new approach to what has
been one of our society's most intractable dilemmas.4
Thank you. I eagerly await Professor Graye's comments on the
constitutional issues.
ProfessorGraye:
It's a pleasure to be here. This has always been one of my favorite cities. Coming as I do from the chilly North, the balmy
weather here today is especially welcome.
My primary focus is going to be on the constitutional issues
raised in Voting with Dollars. I agree with the previous speaker
that Ackerman and Ayres have proposed a brilliant new approach
to our current campaign finance problems. Unfortunately, however, that does not guarantee its immunity from constitutional
challenge.
Before addressing the constitutional issues, I would like to begin with a whirlwind tour of the case law in order to provide some
perspective. It takes me about three weeks to cover this material
in my course on election law. Obviously, I'm going to be leaving
out a lot of nuances, but I think you will get the main outline.

42. Id. at 10.
43. Id. at 10-11.
44. Another imaginative proposal that might warrant further explanation is John
Nagle's suggestion that legislators "be required to recuse themselves from voting on issues
directly affecting contributors." John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign
FinanceLegislation, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 69, 69 (2000).
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It all began in 1976. (Arguably, it may have begun earlier, perhaps with the Watergate break-in, but 1976 is when the judicial
doctrine really began.) The United States Supreme Court's landmark decision, Buckley v. Valeo,4" has determined the shape of
current campaign finance law. One of the most important holdings was the constitutionality of public funding for campaigns,
even when receipt of those funds is conditioned on some restrictions.4 6 The Court's response to direct limitations on campaign
spending, however, was much more mixed.
The Court distinguished sharply between limits on expenditures and limits on contributions.4" The Court found the interests
invoked by the government to be insufficient to justify the expenditure restrictions.4 The Justices were openly scornful of the argument that the expenditure limits were necessary to neutralize
the effects of wealth on political campaigns.5 0 According to the
Court,
[Tihe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources,'" and "'to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the51bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people."'

Or, as a colleague of mine once put it, the Court's message to
egalitarians was "eat dirt and die"!
2
The Court was less hostile to the contribution restrictions.5
Unlike restrictions on a person's expenditures, the Court said, a
contribution limitation places "little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe

45. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
46. Id. at 86-109.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 19-21.
49. Id. at 19-20, 39-50.
50. See id. at 48-49.
51. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957))).
52. See id. at 21.
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the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.""3 The
Court found ample justification for the restriction:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity
of our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although
the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the
1972 elec54
tion demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.

"Of almost equal concern," the Court added, is the "appearance
of corruption" due to public awareness of the potential for abuse
created by large contributions.55
Buckley's distinction between expenditures and contributions
has always been controversial, but it seems to be holding firm.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Political Action Committee,56 was a replay of the contribution prong of Buckley. A Missouri statute imposed strict limits on contributions to candidates
for state office.5 Reaffirming Buckley, Justice Souter's opinion for
the Court upheld these contribution limits, finding them to be
"'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest."'5 8 Notably, Justice Souter found a legitimate interest not only in preventing actual corruption but in avoiding "the broader threat
from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors."59 The Court continued that to "[1]eave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to
take part in democratic governance.""0 The message of Shrink
Missouri is that Buckley is alive and well, despite its critics.
Many people talk about the "hydraulic effect," in which blocking campaign spending in one area just causes it to pop up somewhere else. Ackerman and Ayres give a nice statement of this
theory:

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27.
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
Id. at 382 (citing MO. REV. STAT § 130.032 (1994)).
Id. at 387-88 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
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According to this increasingly fashionable view, controlling the flow
of campaign funds is like the effort to dam the Mississippi. You may
stop the river from overflowing its banks at one point, but this triumph will lead to unexpected inundations elsewhere. Like water
seeking its own level, private money will inexorably flow around reformist barriers to overwhelm the political process.

The hydraulic view has some historical support. One effect of
Buckley was an increase in the importance of campaign spending
by political action committees ("PACs"), corporations, and other
groups. The Court has struggled to deal with the constitutional
fall-out of this development. In CaliforniaMedical Association v.
FEC,62 the Court upheld limits on contributions to PACs. 6 ' A 1971
federal statute limited both individuals' and associations' contributions to multi-candidate political committees to $5000 per
year.6 4 Following the Buckley analysis, the Court concluded that
the limit on contributions validly furthered the government's interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption.65 In contrast,
in FEC v. National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee,6 6 the
Court struck down limits on PAC expenditures.6 7
In the 1990s, the flood of campaign funding jumped into a different channel called "soft money." To an increasing extent, campaign contributions were funneled through political parties,
which then used the money to support the election of their candidates. Ackerman and Ayres observe that "[elnormous gifts of soft
money" went to political parties, reinforcing the risk that "the
American system is indeed veering dangerously toward oligarchy."6" Colorado litigation over this use of "soft money" gave rise
to two Supreme Court opinions. In the first opinion, a clear majority of the Court held that the First Amendment shielded "independent" party expenditures, just as it would shield independent
expenditures by individuals. 69 The second opinion focused on coordinated expenditures by political parties-whereby the party
61. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 8.
62. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
63. Id. at 184-85
64. See id. at 185 (citing Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C), (f)
(1976)).
65. Id. at 195-99.
66. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
67. See id. at 483.
68. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 51.
69. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) [hereinafter Colorado Republican I].
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pays for certain campaign ads over which the candidate has some
degree of control.7" In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the Buckley framework and upheld
the statute's treatment of these coordinated expenditures as candidate contributions.7 1 Exactly what impact these decisions will
72
have on current efforts to regulate soft money remains unclear.
I know this doctrine may seem a little dry, but please bear with
me: we're almost done. The only (partial) deviation from the pattern of upholding contribution limits and invalidating expenditure limits has been in the area of corporate speech, where the
Court's approach has wobbled.7" In First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti,74 the Court struck down a statute prohibiting corporations from spending money to influence referendums on subjects
unrelated to their business.75 Yet, federal law has long prohibited
corporations from making campaign contributions to candidates.
In FEC v. National Right to Work Committee,76 the Court found
77
sufficient potential for corruption to justify such restrictions.
These cases do fit the Buckley pattern, but the next decision took
a surprising turn.
In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,78 the Court
upheld a state prohibition on corporate expenditures in political
campaigns except through special political action funds. 79 The
Court found that the statute burdened the corporation's First
Amendment rights."0 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute
because it was supported by a compelling state interest in preventing corporations from channeling funds obtained from con-

70. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) [hereinafter ColoradoRepublican II].
71. See id. at 447.
72. See Richard L. Hasen, The Constitutionalityof a Soft Money Ban After Colorado Republican II, 1 ELECTION L.J. 195, 195 (2002) (stating that the decision supports the constitutionality of such a ban but that a change in the Court's composition could doom campaign
reform legislation).
73. See FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982); First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
74. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
75. Id. at 767.
76. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
77. Id. at 208.
78. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
79. Id. at 654-55 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979)).
80. Id. at 658.
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sumers and investors into political campaigns."1 The Court distinguished Buckley and Bellotti, which had found expenditure
limits to be too distantly related to "'financial quid pro quo'" corruption of the political process." Rather than being aimed at corruption, the ban on partisan corporate expenditures was designed
to end "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas." 3
With all of this background in mind, we're finally in a position
to think about the constitutional arguments regarding Patriot
dollars and the secret donation booth. Ackerman and Ayres
themselves seem rather unconcerned about constitutional issues:
their chapter on the subject is entitled, "Who's Afraid of the Supreme Court?" 4 Indeed, they see no serious prospect of a constitutional challenge, finding that "[i]f Americans take the path
marked out by the new paradigm, the Supreme Court will not
stand in the way of a major breakthrough for democracy. There is
absolutely nothing to stop citizens from reclaiming their sover85
eignty-other than a lack of political will and imagination."
Far be it from me to predict the Court's future decisions. As
Ackerman and Ayres themselves say, "the Supreme Court's
shocking decision in Bush v. Gore has shaken the public's confidence in the impartiality of judges on high-stakes electoral matters."8 6 If not public confidence, generally, it has at least shaken
the confidence of many law professors. Maybe that's too cynical,
but if nothing else, Bush v. Gore 7 does illustrate the difficulty of

81. Id. at 660.
82. Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497 (1985)).
83. Id. at 660. The most interesting aspect of Austin is its treatment of the equality justification for campaign reform. Instead of attempting to equalize the relative influence of
speakers-a purpose found to be illegitimate in Buckley-the corporate expenditure ban "ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations" by forcing the corporation to raise money for political expenditures separately. Id.
The implication seems to be that leveling the voices of the wealthy is not a permissible goal,
but preventing them from gaining additionalleverage through the use of corporate funds is
allowable. For a perceptive analysis of the Austin decision, see Julian N. Eule, Promoting
Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105.
84. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 140.
85. Id. at 141.
86. Id. at 131.
87. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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trying to forecast judicial decisions. Still, it's worth speculating on
8
how the Justices would view Voting with Dollars."

One of my reasons for recounting the Court's decisions at such
length is to allow you to see how cleverly Ackerman and Ayres
have crafted their program. First, as they point out and as our
review of the caselaw has confirmed, the program is designed to
fit the one interest that the Court has found compelling:
Despite judicial hostility on other fronts, the Court has been remarkably consistent in emphasizing that there is one rationale for
public regulation with an impeccable constitutional pedigree. Like
most sensible people, the justices are well aware that big givers can
gain special influence over politicians, and they have regularly sustained legislation that can plausibly be viewed 8 as
efforts to reduce
9
the risk-or even the appearance-of corruption.

Thus, the Court should be sympathetic to the goal of reducing
special interest influence, at least in the form of actual or apparent quid pro quos. 9°
Second, the Buckley Court did accept public funding, even accompanied by conditions on candidates who accept the funding.9
The Patriot dollars part of the scheme is simply an indirect
method of public financing. 92 Indeed, the Court's recent decision
upholding school vouchers suggests that it may find Patriot dollars even more acceptable than direct public funding. 93 In the
voucher case, the Court was willing to allow vouchers in a context
where it would probably have found direct funding unconstitutional, because the allocation of the funds depended on "true private choice." 94 So the basic idea of Patriot dollars looks bulletproof.
Third, the scheme neither directly controls speech, nor limits
the amounts of contributions-except in a few special circumstances.9" Rather, it allows donors to say anything they like; the
only limit is that they can't give their checks directly to candi-

88.

ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 142-143.
Id. at 142.
Id.; see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (2002).
Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467.
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 182.
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dates.9 6 This looks like a limitation on conduct rather than
speech.97 Thus, Ackerman and Ayres argue, their proposal places
no limit on free speech at all:
Our free-speech analysis has been exceptionally trouble free because
we could entirely avoid this classical exercise in balancing. The reason is simple: Our model statute refuses to impose any new restrictions on the things private citizens can say to one another. As a conthere
sequence, there was no occasion to begin balancing, because
98
was no effort to repress anybody's speech in the first place.

Finally, Ackerman and Ayres say, there is only a minimal intrusion on freedom of association: "Our statute only prohibits
groups from creating political action committees that shunt
money directly to candidates."9 9 Otherwise, groups remain free to
advocate issues or endorse candidates.' ° They can also publicly
donate Patriot dollars to candidates. 10 1
As you can see, the proposal really does a pretty good job of
squeezing itself within current doctrine. However, I am not as
certain as Ackerman and Ayres about how the Court will respond. °2 No doubt there is plenty to quibble about in the details
of their proposals-and as we have seen, the Court is quite capable of constitutional nit-picking in this area. But there are some
more basic issues.
To begin with, Ackerman and Ayres may underestimate the effect of their proposal on associational rights.' 3 Consider how we
would view such restrictions outside of the political context. Ackerman and Ayres themselves ask to "[i]magine what would happen to Yale's large contributions if the university announced that
it would accept only anonymous donations."0 4 This is less troublesome in its effect on contributions (where, after all, the Court
has upheld direct limitations) than on expenditures. 1 5 The

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 148.
See id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 152.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 153.
102. Id. at 151-53.
103. See id. at 150-54.
104. Id. at 251 n.7.
105. See id. at 119. Even the $100,000 per year limit on an individual's contributions to
all campaigns may be troublesome. Id. at 117.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:979

scheme impacts expenditures by associations rather directly. It
covers all issue advocacy by political parties, which seems very
hard to square with ColoradoRepublicans 1.106 It also places a cap
on individual contributions to PACs for issue advocacy, 10 7 and encumbers issue advocacy by any group that also wants to set up a
PAC using Patriot dollars.'0 8 Issue advocacy, as opposed to explicit campaign speech, is a touchy subject for regulation.' 9 Most
of these limits are backstops to the limits on direct contributions,
intended to stop evasion of the blind donation booth."' Given the
cumulative impact of the provisions, it may be hard to persuade
the Court that they are narrowly tailored to the compelling interest in preventing corruption."'
More significant is the possibility that the Court will reject the
secret donation booth on principle. The whole idea of the secret
donation booth is that we are better off suppressing information
about the identity of donors. 112 But the Supreme Court of the
United States likes to fulminate about the evils of suppressing information, repeating that the choice between the dangers of suppressing information and the dangers of too much information is
a choice that "the First Amendment makes for us."" 3 If the Court
thinks current disclosure and contribution limits are reasonably
effective, it might be unwilling to accept an anonymity requirement as an acceptable alternative; in fact, it might think that the
anonymity requirement is more intrusive on First Amendment
values. For example, one might wonder whether it is really necessary, in the name of blocking corruption, to prevent issue-based
groups from directly collecting small gifts and giving them openly
to candidates." 4

106. 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996); ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 117-18, 124.
107. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 117.
108. Id. at 119, 124-25.
109. Id. at 124.
110. Id. at 97.
111. But see id. at 152-53.
112. Id. at 26-30.
113. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (quoting
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). Indeed, Linmark could be considered directly on point: the anonymous donation booth is the
equivalent of the undisclosed house sale. Id. at 86.
114. The Court's decision in Beaumont v. FEC, 278 F.3d 261, 277 (4th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted 123 S. Ct. 556 (2002), may shed light on this.
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There is all the more reason to be concerned about the Court's
reaction because Ackerman and Ayres do not conceal their central
purpose, which is to cancel out the undue influence of the wealthy
on political debate. 115 As you'll recall, Professor Browne extolled
their justification for this goal. 116 It's true that the proposal is de-

signed to look corruption-oriented, but the underlying motivation
is clearly to promote equality. Recall that in Buckley, the Court
found this particular interest in equality to be an affront to the
First Amendment." 7 Knowing of the core purpose of the proposal,
the Court is all the more likely to be stingy in its appraisal of specific provisions.
I'm afraid this has been a rather pedestrian discussion of doctrine. From that point of view, I am sure you'll find our next presentation a bit different. From our chat before the session, I understand that Professor Whyte is planning to connect campaign
reform issues with a Canadian campaign to kill harp seals.
Sounds pretty lively! I will be waiting with considerable anticipation to find out how he manages to make this connection.
ProfessorWhyte:
Well, I guess it's my turn. As you know, I'm not really a constitutional scholar, so I was a little nervous about appearing here
today. Luckily, the last speaker has covered the constitutional issues quite thoroughly. "' I will focus instead on the policy aspects
of the proposal. I'm going to raise some questions about whether
the authors have correctly diagnosed the problem, and about
whether their solution will work as well as they expect.
But before I get into that, I want to make clear my admiration
for their creativity and ingenuity. Public policy debates tend to
get stuck in ruts, and we badly need fresh insights on problems
like campaign reform.
I know that it may seem odd to refer to environmental law in
this setting. But I take some comfort from the fact that Ackerman

115.
116.
117.
text.
118.

See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 62.
See supra notes 10-44 and accompanying text.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976); see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying
See supra notes 45-117 and accompanying text.
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and Ayres themselves do so at the beginning of their book.1 1 9 They
refer to the current paradigm as treating "big money as if it
raised a problem similar to the one posed by polluters dumping
garbage into a waterway." 2 ' They go on to compare current campaign regulations to EPA regulations, pointing out that the EPA
"not only restricts the garbage each polluter can dump but places
an overall limit on the amount of junk in the river."1 2' "Why not,"
they ask rhetorically, "do the same when big money pollutes democratic politics?"'2 2 I say this is a rhetorical question because
the authors promptly dump on the people who approach the issue
this way. They reject this analogy on the next page because voting is special: "Command and control, bureaucratic subsidies, and
are part of the problem [in politics], not part of
full information
23
the solution."
That may well be true, but in those terms, even environmental
law is starting to look a lot less like their picture than they may
realize. Ackerman and Ayres may be right that the old environmental regulation may not be very relevant in this context. In my
environmental regulation has some imview, however, the new
24
us.'
for
lessons
portant
Because of my concerns about the Ackerman and Ayres proposal, I would be very nervous about ditching the current system
of campaign regulations and adopting the proposal outright. As
an environmental law teacher, I tend to see things in ecological
terms. The political system is a very complex ecology, and we
should be leery of making huge overnight changes. 2 ' But that
doesn't mean that we should just leave it in its present damaged
state. Instead, I think we should take a leaf from current ecological thinking and consider using a technique called "adaptive
management" to revitalize this ecosystem. 2 ' I will close with
some thoughts about how Voting with Dollars might fit into such
an approach.

119. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 3.
120. Id. This pollution analogy is skillfully developed in Nagle, supra note 5, at 316-27.
121. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Like any new regulatory regime, there is a necessary price tag associated with the
exchange of new systems and solutions for outdated ones. Our task today is to determine if
Ackerman and Ayres's price tag is too high. See id. at 3-5, 18-22.
125. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 178-82.
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I don't want to belabor these points, but I have some real
doubts about whether their system will work as well as Ackerman and Ayres anticipate. Some of this may just seem like nitpicking, but it's these little practical details that sometimes trip
up a really nifty scheme.
Let me begin with Patriot dollars.12 7 The big question here is
the participation rate. 128 Ackerman and Ayres say they would be
"very surprised if the first election cycle under the new paradigm
did not generate more funds than the last cycle held under the
current system."12 9 But, they add, "we have been surprised before."13 ° As they admit, "there isn't anything in the real world that
is close1 enough to Patriot dollars to permit meaningful extrapola13
tion.
One problem is motivation. I don't know whether people really
care enough to participate. Ackerman and Ayres give us a lot of
discouraging information about voter apathy. 132 Only a few voters
care enough to vote against someone for taking special interest
money.133 Only between four and twelve percent care enough 13to
donate even a few dollars of their money to political candidates. 1
One reason for my concern is that Patriot dollars won't be all
that easy to use. 135 Ackerman and Ayres seem to think otherwise,
but I bet they're the kind of people who know how to program
their VCRs. The Ackerman and Ayres proposal looks a bit more
daunting. 136 In addition, you can't spend your Patriot dollars
unless you inform yourself about the candidates, but Ackerman
and Ayres concede that "most voters pay scant attention to politics."1 37 The informational resources of the poor, the uneducated,

127. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 4-6.
128. See id. at 89.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 87.
132. See id. at 26-30.
133. See id. at 27.
134. Id. at 31.
135. See id. at 4-11.
136. See id. at 33-38. Much of the complexity is apparently designed to prevent sales of
Patriot dollars. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 38-40. I am not sure that sales are
a serious problem. In equilibrium, Patriot dollars should trade for their face value minus
transaction costs, so there is no incentive to purchase them.
137. Id. at 27.
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and the young are already stretched thin.131 Yet, these are the
very groups whose voices an egalitarian should be most concerned
about.
Also, I have trouble imagining how their system is going to be
implemented on real-world ATMs.1" 9 At least where I live, ATMs
aren't very fancy; they're not much like iMacs.14 ° An ATM screen
doesn't display much information at a time, and the inputs are
limited. Somehow, this limited terminal is going to have to offer
voters a lot of choices, including allocations between primary and
general elections, and the option of donating to any congressional
candidate anywhere in the country."' This is going to take a lot of
sub-menus. My guess is that people will be just about as unhappy
with this system as with automated voice menus now available on
the telephone. You know what I mean-where you have to press
five different numbers in response to a succession of annoying
verbal options, in the hope of eventually getting to a live person
in the end. We are asking a lot of citizens who couldn't handle the
famous South Florida butterfly ballot.
Another problem is that people may be unwilling to register
their ATM cards. They may not want to entrust local election officials with this information, or they may fear that it will fall into
the hands of hackers.
So, I am not so sure how many people are going to use these
Patriot dollars. In a footnote, Ackerman and Ayres present some
14 2
worrisome empirical evidence about likely participation rat3s.
Only about seven percent of taxpayers claimed the small deduction for campaign contributions, which federal law used to provide."' In Minnesota, only sixty thousand people claimed a state
refund for political contributions, and only about five times that
many used the check-off box on their tax returns to contribute to

138. See MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE? 2-3, 77, 91-95,
142-44, 163 (2002) (arguing that the political system needs to be more user friendly to attract voters).
139. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 4-11.
140. The Law Review editors were worried that the term "iMac" might be confusing to
some of the less computer savy. It refers to a product in the Macintosh line of Apple Computers.
141. See id. at 256 n.2. There is no reason we can't upgrade all of those ATMs to allow
greater input and output, but then we're talking about real money. After all, there are over
140,000 ATMs in the country. Id. at 256 n.2.
142. Id. at 262 n.33.
143. Id.
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a campaign election fund. ' Minnesota is a small state, but not
that small. It also has very high rates of political participation. 145
In the 2000 Presidential election, sixty-nine percent of the voting
age population went to the polls-a little over two million people.' 46 Out of this total, the number of Minnesotans who could be
4 7 My guess is
bothered to use the tax check-off is not impressive.
148
lower.
that national participation would be a lot
How many people should we expect to register their ATM
cards, find out about candidates, go to an ATM, and work their
way through whatever menus are required to make a donation?
No doubt, some people will make the effort, just as some people
will stand in line to vote in a local school board election. But I
wouldn't be a bit surprised if participation starts small and stays
small.
This is important, not only because of the significance that Ackerman and Ayres put on Patriot funding for its own sake, but
because of the way it affects the rest of their scheme. They are
counting on Patriot dollars to flood out efforts by special interests
to dodge the anonymous donation, both through "issue advocacy"
campaigns or otherwise. 149 If Patriot dollars total $500 million
rather than the $5 billion they forecast, 150 this argument won't
work. Ackerman and Ayres have a scheme to multiply Patriot dollars in order to help balance private donations, 5 ' but if the multiplier has to be five or ten, a small percentage of the population is
going to be controlling the flow of a large amount of public
money. 152 That would merely recreate the excess influence15 of
small minorities that characterizes current campaign finance. 1
I also have some doubts about the security of the anonymous
donation booth. The movie industry spent millions and millions of

144. Id. at 263 n.33.
145. Office of the Minn. Sec'y of State, November 7, 2000 General Election Results, at
http://elections.sos.state.mn.us/ENR2000_General/ElecMenu.htm
(last visited Mar. 13,
2003).
146. Id.
147. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 262 n.33.
148. For further discussion of the participation issue, see Charles, supra note 17.
149. Id. at 120.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 120-21.
152. See id. at 120-21, 252 n.9 (giving figures on size distributions of donations).
153. See id. at 252 n.9.
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dollars to devise a secure encryption for DVDs, in order to pre' A fifteen-year-old
vent unauthorized copying. 54
Norwegian boy
155
promptly cracked the code.
How confident can we be that no
one will hack into all of the various electronic records involved in
this scheme? Especially since a lot of people might think it's public spirited to expose the sources of a candidate funding-one person's breach of security is another person's "turning over a rock to
see what's crawling around underneath."
And can we be sure of the anti-"bombing" encryption scheme
that is supposed to mask large donations from candidates? 156 The
scheme does create a lot of noise in the system, but it's still possible to communicate despite that noise if you're clever. "'
Recall that candidates will get their money on a daily basis, except "when there is a truly remarkable increase in receipts arriving on a particular day, and only when the uptick is attributable
to a small number of big gifts."1 5 One possibility is to avoid triggering the algorithm by making multiple gifts just below the
threshold. Ackerman and Ayres say they have an answer to this
strategy,15 9 but I'm not altogether convinced. Ackerman and
Ayres admit that further refinements of the secrecy algorithm
may be necessary. 6 ° I wonder whether there's any ultimate way
to prevent the transmission of credible messages.
Several other factors might also make it easier to crack the system. First, Ackerman and Ayres assume that most people won't
reveal how they spent their Patriot dollars.1 6' But as exit polls
show, it's possible to get very reliable information about how people performed in a completely confidential setting, just by holding
154. See Rachel Simpson Shockley, Note, The Digital Millennium CopyrightAct and the
FirstAmendment: Can They Co-Exist?, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 275, 279 (2001) (noting that the
fifteen-year-old, along with two others whom he met off the internet, reverse engineered a
DVD player to create DeCSS, which is capable of decrypting DVDs).
155. Id. For further information about the ensuing litigation and the teenager's recent
acquittal, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Norwegian Teenager Jon Johansen Acquitted
in DVD Case (Jan. 7, 2003), at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/DeCSS-prosecutions/Johansen
_DeCSS_ case/20030107_eff.pr.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
156. AcKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 104-05.
157. Id. at 107.
158. Id. at 105.
159. See id. at 238-39.
160. See id. at 107.
161. The authors support their assumption by analogizing the use of Patriot dollars to
disclosure of voting, but for some reason they seem to overlook the existence of exit polls as
an analogy. See id. at 29.
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up a microphone and asking them afterwards. If candidates can
accurately track the background flow of small contributions, it
will be easier to factor them out of the statistics and find signs of
the larger contributions. Second, donor anonymity may not be as
simple as Ackerman and Ayres think.'6 2 Wealthy individuals and
rich organizations generally have staffs. If people start playing
games with the system-for example, by making contributions to
the blind trust and then getting refunds sent to another checking
account-they face a very real risk of exposure.
In short, I find some reason to doubt whether the scheme will
work as smoothly as its creators imagine. These concerns about
the mechanics of the scheme are less significant, however, than
the uncertainty about the nature of the problem that is being addressed. Much of Ackerman and Ayres's book seems to be founded
on the view that campaign donors are buying influence.' 6 3 That
seems logical enough, but an alternative view is also somewhat
plausible. Donors may simply give their money to candidates who
already support their views, expecting those candidates to stick
with their established positions in the future.'6 4 Although I'm no
expert, the empirical evidence on this question seems to be mixed.
There is some evidence that the "campaign contribution contract,"
if there is one, is very weak and lacks serious sanctions.16 5
Thus, to the extent that the secret donation booth is supposed
to prevent legislators from rewarding contributors with favors, we
don't really know whether it is addressing a real problem-let
alone the scope of the problem. We also can't verify the theory
that special interests will stop making donations if they can't expect return favors. They may be more interested in electing legislators with their favorite views than in any implicit quid pro quo.

162. See id. at 28-30.
163. Id. at 30-32.
164. See Nolan McCarty & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Commitment and the Campaign
Contribution Contract,40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 872, 874 (1996).
165. See id. at 872-75 (finding weak sanctions against donors who fail to renew their contributions); see also Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics? 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2002) (summarizing empirical and theoretical arguments
against theory that contributions influence future legislative votes). But see Stacy B. Gordon,
All Votes Are Not Created Equal: CampaignContributions and CriticalVotes, 63 J. POL. 249,
250-53 (2001) (conceding that prior evidence on influence of campaign contributions is ambiguous but arguing that contributions are more likely to influence legislators when they are
the swing voters on a provision).
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I must say that I find the Ackerman and Ayres view of the subject intuitively plausible, but we just don't know whether it is correct. If it is wrong, then their proposal may be misdirected, imposing significant social costs for little gain. These social costs do
not merely include the direct costs of their donation system, but
depriving voters of information about what groups support particular politicians. For example, as an environmentalist, I would
find it significant that a given candidate was receiving heavy
funding by the oil industry, but the secret donation booth deprives me of this information.
If participation in the patriot dollar program does not meet
their expectations, while special interest funding remains high
despite the anonymous donation booth, then the Ackerman and
Ayres proposal might not do very much to equalize the political
voices of our citizens. Under those circumstances, large-scale public funding by the government might be a better option. In the
meantime, we could be worse off than we are under the current
system.
Another uncertainty is the extent to which independent expenditures are an important part of the problem. Ackerman and
Ayres assume that uncoordinated independent expenditures are
much less valuable to candidates than contributions.16 6 If they are
right, and if large, direct contributions do dry up because of the
secret donation booth, and if participation in the patriot program
is reasonably high, then politicians may cease to devote so much
time and energy to getting the support of large donors. 161 I agree
with Ackerman and Ayres that this would be a desirable outcome.168 But that is a lot of ifs.
My basic point so far has been that there are tremendous uncertainties surrounding the Ackerman and Ayres proposal, both
in terms of whether it correctly identifies the root problem and
whether its mechanisms will work as planned. I certainly don't
mean to make a firm prediction about the success or failure of
their proposal. What I do mean to say, however, is that there is a
lot more uncertainty than you might expect from reading the

166. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 122.
167. In the alternative, as Ackerman and Ayres put it, "[p]oliticians will dispense with
most private sessions with big donors when they can no longer tell whether there is a real
payoff." Id. at 95.
168. See id. at 94.
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book. Maybe it would work, maybe it wouldn't. If it doesn't, we
might do some significant harm to the political system before we
figured out the problem and went on to some other method of
campaign regulation. But that's not necessarily a justification for
giving up on efforts to address campaign reform.
It's here that I think we may be able to learn something from
environmental law. I realize that the connection may not be immediately obvious, but I hope you'll be patient with me during
what might appear to be a long digression. (If nothing else, I hope
you'll find it an interesting digression.)
Somewhat paradoxically, if there's one thing that environmental regulators do really know, it's the extent of their own uncertainty. The point was nicely made by Christopher Stone in a
book published ten years ago: "[w]e are only beginning to learn
how the world works."'69 After recalling "our ignorance ...about
the dynamics of globe-spanning climate and current," 7 0 he added
some examples: "Scientists have only started to inventory the
world's forests and monitor the thickness of the ice caps .... As
for biodiversity, we do not know how many species there are to
imperil."17 ' Part of the problem is simply that we are in the early
stages of scientific investigation, but another part of the problem
is that so many environmental problems involve complex dynamic
systems with nonlinear properties. For example, instead of the
familiar "balance of nature," ecologists currently tend to view the
chaotic interactions in
biosphere as characterized by complicated, 172
which any equilibrium is purely temporary.
The new ecology indicates that prediction is very difficult and
that our intuitions about causation may not hold true. For instance, consider the Canadian government's effort to rescue its

169. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
AND HUMAN AGENDA 24 (1993).

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. For an excellent summary of the recent literature, see Fred Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 207 (2002). For a
survey of implications of environmental regulation and understanding law as a complex
adaptive system, see J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How To Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOuS.
L. REV. 933 (1997). Recent research on large-scale networks also reveals the emergence of
unexpected properties that may make control difficult; for an accessible introduction to the
subject, including a discussion of implications for ecology, see generally MARK BUCHANAN,
NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 138-55 (2002).
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failing cod fishery by killing harp seals.1 73 The government's reasoning was simple: harp seals eat cod; ergo, fewer harp seals
means more cod. The Canadian government insisted that this
was a matter of common sense.174 (I have to say that even if the
logic was right, I'd feel some qualms about the brutality of the solution. But I'm just a soft-headed environmentalist.) As it turns
out, however, this common sense logic overlooks the fact that
harp seals eat many other species, which in turn affect additional
species, which in turn affect cod. Consequently, the effect of
eliminating half a million harp seals per year is hard to predict:
In the face of this overwhelming complexity, it is clearly not possible
to foresee the ultimate effect of killing seals on the numbers of some
commercial fish. With fewer seals off the Canadian coast, the number of halibut and sculpin might grow, and since they
both eat cod,
175
there may well end up being fewer cod than before.

Moreover, computer simulations show that, while removing
some species may have little effect on the overall food web, removing others can cause drastic changes affecting many spe17
cies. 1
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal might have similar unpredictable effects. For example, if people feel that they have fulfilled
their civic duties by using the Patriot dollars, they might be less
likely to turn out and vote in primaries. Or, having committed
themselves to a candidate with a Patriot donation early in the
campaign, they may feel wedded to that candidate and close their
ears to any further information. Either of these effects would lead
to adjustments in the behavior of candidates and other political
actors, with further unpredictable consequences.17 7
Understanding the dynamic and unpredictable nature of ecological systems has required considerable rethinking of methods
of environmental management. The buzzword these days is
"adaptive management"-the theory is that regulatory methods
must be experimental and provisional, designed to foster a learn-

173. See BUCHANAN, supra note 172, at 140-41.
174. Id. at 141.
175. Id.

176. Id at 152-54.
177. For a discussion of other possible forms of fallout from the proposal, see generally
Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change Under "Voting with Dollars," 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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ing process by the regulator. 17 8 Again, fisheries provide an instructive example. For instance, fisheries expert James Wilson
has several suggestions about how to cope with uncertainty. One
is to use nested governance areas to foster parallel learning about
ecosystem behavior.1 79
I suppose it would be possible to develop some kind of analogy
between voters and schools of fish, with PACs and soft money
playing some kind of predatory role. I can assure you that I have
no intention of doing so, however. PACs aren't halfway as cute as
harp seals. No kidding.
Rather, I think the lesson from the recent environmental experience is less direct. Like ecology, the political system is dynamic and unpredictable, with numerous feedback loops and
other interactions. We can't design solutions on the assumption
that we have already accurately diagnosed the problem and can
predict the effects of a proposed solution. But that does not mean
paralysis. Instead, it means a more experimental approach, with
lots of emphasis on learning and modifying our initiatives as we
go along.8 0 I would draw a couple of lessons about campaign finance reform.
First, it is foolhardy to believe that we can replace existing
mechanisms with radical new alternatives, as Ackerman and
Ayres propose, and have any hope of predicting the ultimate outcome. Politics is a very complex system, and predicting how it will
react to a radical disturbance is as difficult as predicting the effect of introducing or removing a species in an ecosystem. This is
a high-risk gamble. At this point, I don't think that Ackerman
and Ayres have made the case for rolling those particular dice.

178. See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 323-39 (2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem

Governance:Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 190, 194-206 (2002).
179.

See James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the Design of Com-

mon-Pool Institutions,in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 327, 340, 345-49 (Elinor Ostrom et
al. eds., 2002).
180. For a general argument for an experimental approach to public law issues, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,98 COLUM.
L. REV. 267 (1998). At this point, I'm not prepared to work out exactly what "adaptive management" would mean for campaign reform. All such flexible approaches to management
raise questions about the scope of administrative discretion. Since we are at the heart of politics in this instance, those concerns would be especially acute. So it may not be possible to
directly translate what environmental regulators are beginning to do into the sphere of campaign regulation.
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Second, the only way to make any real progress in restoring the
political ecology is to conduct some experiments. In the article I
discussed a few minutes ago, Wilson mentioned the desirability of
"nested governance" to obtain the benefits of parallel learning.'8 1
That is, if we try different methods in different regions, and compare the results with the status quo, we begin to learn something
about how to fix things. Although I'm not prepared to endorse the
principles of Voting with Dollars as a nationwide experiment, it
would be extremely useful to give it a try on a smaller scale." 2
I do not see any reason why a single state shouldn't adopt the
proposal-the downside risk is much smaller at the state level.
Actually, it would be ideal if several states would conduct somewhat different experiments, adopting different parts of the
scheme and trying some variations. If the experiment works,
that's wonderful, and we can adopt the approach nationally.
On the other hand, if it doesn't work, we may be able to do
some fine-tuning to remove some flaws in the proposal. Or maybe
we will learn that whole idea is unworkable, for example, that
people just won't bother to make their ATM contributions. If so,
we'll have to look for new ways to address the problems.
If we ditch our current scheme of campaign regulation at a national level in favor of every clever scheme that comes along,
we're courting disaster, but if we refuse to experiment, we're
never going to get anywhere. So let's see Connecticut or some
other state adopt contribution ATMs and donation booths, and
let's find out what happens.
Ackerman and Ayres describe themselves as "unrepentant social engineers."8 3 I'm not by any means in favor of sitting back
and ignoring social problems. But I think what we need in the
Twenty-First Century are not social engineers but social ecologists.
Oh dear, I see that I've run way over my time. I wondered why
the moderator kept handing me little slips of paper. Unfortunately, I don't have my glasses so I couldn't read them. Anyway,

181. See supratext accompanying note 179.
182. For an example of successful state-level innovation in campaign finance regulation,
see generally Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices,205 F.3d 455
(1st Cir. 2000) (upholding Maine's innovative public funding scheme).
183. ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 1, at 33.
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thank you all for being so patient with . me. Hopefully, when I
write this up for the law review, it will be a little more coherent!
Thanks again.
Moderator:
I'm sure that those of you who are experienced conferencegoers aren't surprised that the presentations ran over their allotted times. I know you must be getting hungry-all that talk about
fish probably only made it worse!-but I think we do have time
for a couple of questions while they're setting up lunch in the
courtyard.
Audience Member:
This is for Professor Whyte. Could you explain your method of
getting around the anonymous voting booth for us?
ProfessorWhyte:
Let me start by giving you an example, then I'll explain Ackerman and Ayres's response to this strategy, and then I'll tell
you why I'm not satisfied with the response. This gets a little
complicated, and it's a bit tangential. So if you're not too interested in the details, you might want to use this chance to duck
out to the restroom.
As Ackerman and Ayres note, a married couple can make a
joint contribution of $5,000 to a Congressional House race, and a
candidate who sees this contribution on the promised day would
have a "38 percent confidence that a claimed gift had in fact been
made."" 4 What they mean by this is that sixty-two percent of the
time, a candidate could expect a shift this size on a single day
purely by chance." 5 But suppose that the couple tells ten candidates that they will make such a contribution to each of them on
specific designated days, for a total of $50,000. The odds that all

184. Id. at 290 n.6.
185. See id. at 234-35 tbl. 3. Ackerman and Ayres consider, but reject as too unworkable,
a formula that would reduce the total cap depending on the number of campaigns to which a
person contributed. Id. at 239.
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ten would see a shift of this size on those specific days merely by
chance is only about 0.8%. So if candidates do see such a shift,
they can really be quite confident that a gift was made.
Audience Member:
Didn't Ackerman and Ayres think of this problem?
Professor Whyte:
When I read the Appendix, I found out that they had thought
of this problem, which made me feel a little less clever. But their
responses aren't very convincing. They say that there are not
enough campaigns (only thirty-nine donation periods per House
cycle), and that multiple donors will claim credit after the fact.
The first is not persuasive because there are also hundreds of
House candidates in any given year. The number of ways of picking ten candidates and contribution periods is astronomical.1 86
The second can be defeated by simply telling the candidates the
plan in advance, so no one else can claim credit afterwards. And
because there are so many ways of picking the ten combinations
of candidates and contribution dates, the odds that two contribu87
tors will happen to pick the same ten in advance are very small."

186. Even if you limit yourself to the twenty most contested House races and assume that
the contributions must all go to members of the same party, there are 780 "slots" (combinations of 20 candidates each with 39 time periods for a donation) and
21,678,298,899,586,545,657,090 or about 21 billion trillion distinct ways of selecting ten
slots. (If my calculations are correct, this is (780!) (770!*10!), using a standard combinatorial
formula which many readers may remember from college or in some cases high school.) The
chances of two donors accidentally picking the same combination of ten slots is too ridiculously small to even write down.
187. False claims by third parties may not be much of a problem, but it's still possible
that a donor will lie, telling the donor that the ten contributions are planned but not following through. In fact, if there is no cost to being caught, everyone in the world should adopt
this strategy, since there is some chance it will work and the out-of-pocket cost is zero. In this
scenario, Ackerman and Ayres would be right that false attributions would defeat the system. But if donors care about their political reputations, this is a very bad strategy. There is
only a 0.8 percent chance that the scheme will work, and if it doesn't work, the purported
donor's future credibility is impaired, not only with these candidates but with everyone else
who hears about their cheating. In effect, they are playing Russian roulette with their political future if they lie. Of course, a full analysis of all the permutations would be complicated,
and I don't claim to have Ayres's expertise in game theory. But I'm pretty confident that this
signaling method works if reputations can be used as hostages for the donor's credibility.
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Audience Member:
But don't Ackerman and Ayres have a way of blocking these
"complex bombing scenarios" by limiting the total amount for contributions to $100,000? Surely your strategy could be blocked that
way or with some other modification of the plan.
Professor Whyte:
I don't think that specific response works here. As they point
out, their limit allows individual contributions to forty House or
Senate candidates.1 88 That's four times as many races as I need
for my method to work. On your larger point, though, I am sure
they could block anything I can come up with. In fact, maybe I've
missed some subtle feature of their original proposal that would
already do so. But the real question isn't whether they're smarter
than I am; it's whether they're smarter than that fifteen-year-old
Norwegian.' 89 Is this system immune from being hacked? That
I'm not so sure about.
Moderator:
Obviously, our mistake was inviting you to speak instead of inviting the Norwegian kid! Seriously, I think we have time for one
more question.
Audience Member:
This one is for Professor Browne. You were very enthusiastic in
your description of Voting with Dollars. The other speakers have
expressed some serious reservations. Has that affected your opinion?
ProfessorBrowne:
Not really. Of course, I take my colleagues' comments seriously,
and some of their observations might be useful in fine-tuning the

188.
189.

ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 1, at 240.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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proposal. But basically, any really new idea is going to face some
risk of judicial attack. And by definition, because a new idea is
new and untested, it will involve some uncertainty. The question
is whether we can afford to stumble along with more variations
on the same old theme or with a few little micro-experiments. I
don't think so. I think our society desperately needs change, and
we can't afford to shy away from bold new options just because
they are bold and new.
Moderator:
I'm told that lunch is served, so Professor Browne will have to
have the last word in this session. I hope you will all join me in
thanking the panelists for their presentations, and of course in
thanking the two authors whose pathbreaking book we've been
talking about. They've all given us much food for thought.

